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Consumption  data  generally  indicates  that  consumption  risk  is not perfectly  diversified  across 
individuals.  This paper considers  if and when imperfect  diversification  is a feature  of efficient 
allocations  in a symmetric  information  environment  without  commitment.  It shows that if indi- 
viduals are sufficiently  patient, imperfect  diversification  is always sub-optimal  in the long run; 
however,  if individuals  are not so patient,  imperfect  diversification  is always  optimal.  The paper 
goes on to demonstrate  that the way that history  matters  in an efficient  allocation  in a symmetric- 
information/no-commitment  environment  can be used to distinguish  lack of commitment  from 
other possible rationalizations  of imperfect  risk sharing,  such as efficiency  in the presence  of 
asymmetric  information. 
One stylized  description  of consumption  data is that, conditional  on per capita consump- 
tion, individual  consumption  is positively  correlated  with current  and lagged individual 
income.' In a frictionless  economy, this fact serves as evidence of inefficiencies  in the 
allocation of consumption  risk. However,  several  recent  papers2  suggest  that incomplete 
diversification  of consumption  risk is actually an optimal response  to the technological 
problem that monitoring  of income or effort is costly. According to this view, in any 
efficient  allocation, consumption  must be correlated  with individual  income in order to 
elicit truth-telling  or adequate  effort. 
A problem with this justification  of incomplete  diversification  is that within many 
risk-sharing  pools, the degree  of asymmetric  information  about  crucial  economic  attributes 
is actually  small (for example,  within  villages,  families  or even across  countries).  Instead, 
a more important  informational  problem  is that it is costly for outside agencies  to learn 
about the critical  economic  attributes  of the "insiders".  As Hart and Moore (1989) have 
emphasized,  this type of informational  problem  makes the enforcement  of contracts  by 
third parties-that is, commitment-difficult  or impossible. 
The first part of this paper asks if and when the statistical  properties  of efficient 
allocations  of risk in the absence  of a commitment  technology  are consistent  with incom- 
plete diversification  of individual  consumption  risk. It considers  an infinite-horizon  model 
with two agents  who have identical  preferences.  Every  period,  the agents  receive  a random 
endowment  of a perishable  consumption  good. Their  endowments  are independently  and 
identically  distributed  over time. Moreover,  there  is no private  information  problem:  each 
agent knows the current  and past realizations  of both endowments.  Every period, the 
agents simultaneously  transfer  a non-negative  amount of consumption to each other. 
Neither agent is able to commit to promises  of future  transfers. 
1. See Cochrane (1991) and Townsend (1994) for empirical  findings that are consistent with this 
description. 
2. See, among  others,  Townsend  (1987),  Green  (1987),  Thomas  and  Worrall  (1990),  Phelan  and  Townsend 
(1991), Atkeson  and Lucas  (1992), and Wang (1994). 
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I show formally  that  autarky  is the worst  subgame-perfect  equilibrium  in this  infinitely 
repeated  game, and use the results  of Abreu (1988) to completely  characterize  the set of 
subgame-perfect  allocations of consumption.  I follow Thomas and Worrall (1988) by 
characterizing  the Pareto frontier  in the set of subgame-perfect  allocations  as a solution 
to a functional  equation.  This  functional  equation  makes  it simple  to derive  various  proper- 
ties about efficient  allocations. 
A standard  folk theorem  (Kimball  (1988)) implies  that if individuals  are sufficiently 
patient,  then some  first-best  allocation  (that is, an allocation  that is efficient  in the presence 
of full commitment)  will be subgame  perfect.  I prove that in this case of high patience, 
every efficient  allocation converges  monotonically  with probability  one to a subgame- 
perfect  first-best  allocation.  Hence,  the long-run  statistical  properties  of an efficient  alloca- 
tion without commitment  look the same as those of an efficient  allocation  with commit- 
ment;  as noted  above, such  statistical  properties  are  inconsistent  with  data  on consumption 
allocations. 
Because  of the two-sided  lack of commitment,  though,  it is possible  that no first-best 
allocation is subgame  perfect if individuals  are sufficiently  impatient  (even if there is a 
non-autarkic  subgame-perfect  allocation).  I prove  that  in this  case,  every  efficient  allocation 
converges  weakly to the same distribution  of consumption,  independent  of initial condi- 
tions. Moreover,  efficiency  implies that the long-run  correlation  between  individual  con- 
sumption and  current and  lagged  individual income,  conditional  on  aggregate 
consumption,  is positive.  Thus,  if individuals  are sufficiently  impatient,  the statistical  prop- 
erties  of efficient  allocations  in symmetric  information  environments  without  commitment 
are similar  in important  respects  to those of the data. 
As noted above, efficient  allocations  in environments  with asymmetric  information 
and full commitment  also exhibit positive correlations  between individual  income and 
individual  consumption. In the second part of the paper, I show how to empirically 
distinguish between efficient allocations in  a  symmetric-information/no-commitment 
world and efficient  allocations  in an asymmetric-information/full-commitment  world. In 
particular,  I demonstrate  that the way history  matters  is very different  in efficient  alloca- 
tions of the two types of environments. 
To see how this works, suppose  MU,' is the marginal  utility  of consumption  of agent 
n in a given  period.  I show that unlike  an asymmetric  information  environment,  efficiency 
in  a  symmetric-information/no-commitment  world  means  that  the  vector 
(MU/N/MU")X~=I'  is a sufficient  statistic  for the future  allocation  of consumption.  Empir- 
ically,  this  means  that  when  the current  consumption  allocation  is regressed  on last period's 
vector (MU,A1 /MUn-  )2J=', and past realizations  of consumption,  the latter should be 
insignificant. 
The above implication  is testable  using only consumption  data (given knowledge  of 
the marginal  utility function). If both consumption  and income data are available,  it is 
possible  to obtain  an even stronger  implication  of efficiency  in environments  with symmet- 
ric information  and no commitment.  First,  the consumption  data can be used to determine 
which agents are constrained  by the lack of commitment  in any given period. Then effi- 
ciency dictates  that the past income realizations  of the constrained  agents will not affect 
their  current  consumption.  We can think  of the economy  as displaying  "amnesia"  because 
it is optimal  for society  to "forget"  the past shocks  hitting  agents  who become  constrained. 
I discuss how this property  can be tested using data on individual  consumption  and 
individual  income.3 
3. While  this article  was under  review,  Ligon, Thomas  and Worrall  (1996) wrote a paper  which makes 
some of the same  points as I do. In particular,  they demonstrate  that all efficient  allocations  converge  to first- 
best allocations  if the latter  are subgame  perfect;  also, they emphasize  the "amnesia"  of the optimal  allocation 
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The theory underlying  this paper is related  to others in the literature.  Thomas and 
Worrall  (1988) characterize  efficient  allocations  in an environment  without commitment 
with one risk-averse  agent and one risk-neutral  agent. Haller (1990), Taub (1989), and 
Coate and Ravaillon  (1993) characterize  the conditions  under  which  first-best  allocations 
are subgame  perfect.  They discuss  various sub-optimal  insurance  schemes  when no first- 
best allocation is subgame perfect, but unlike this paper, they do not talk about the 
properties  of optimal  insurance  schemes.  Gauthier  and Poitevin  (1994) explore  the ability 
of pre-payments  to improve  efficiency  in environments  without commitment  when agents 
have  quadratic  utility.  Finally,  Zhang  (1993), Kehoe  and Levine  (1993), Blume  and Corbae 
(1994), and Alvarez  and Jermann  (1995) investigate  asset trade  in environments  without 
commitment.4 
The rest of this paper  is organized  as follows. Section 1 describes  the basic environ- 
ment. Section 2 defines  and characterizes  subgame  perfection.  Section 3 characterizes  the 
efficient  allocations (in the class of subgame-perfect  allocations).  Section  4 describes  the 
long-run statistical behaviour of efficient  allocations. Section 5 reports some stronger 
empirical implications of  efficiency, and discusses how  to  evaluate them. Section 6 
concludes. 
1. THE ENVIRONMENT 
Consider  the following environment.  There are two infinitely-lived  agents. The state of 
the world in period t is stochastic  and is determined  by the realization  of a discrete  i.i.d. 
random  variable  0,, with support  equal  to { 1, 2, 3,. . . , S}; the probability  of 0, equalling 
s is denoted by ir,  where ir,> 0 for all s. There is a single  perishable  consumption  good. 
The endowments  of the two agents  in period  t, (y,, yt),  are determined  by the realization 
of 0 in that period; the aggregate  endowment  (y,  +y2)  is denoted by Y,. I assume that 
the joint distribution  of the endowments  is symmetric  in the sense that the probability  of 
occurrence  of (y, y') is the same as the probability  of occurrence  of (y', y); I also assume 
that Y, is positive with probability  one. (Note that this description  of the environment 
allows y' and  y2  to be independent  without restricting  attention  to that case.) 
An allocation is a non-negative stochastic vector process ((ci  ),  )2=1  which is measur- 
able with respect  to current  and past realizations  of 0,. A feasible  allocation  is a process 
such that c + c2_ Y,. In period t, the two agents  have identical  preferences  described  by 
the utility function: 
Et Er?-  P'ru(c, +  O<8<  1. 
The cardinal  utility  function  u is increasing  and strictly  concave  and continuously  differen- 
tiable. To guarantee  an interior  solution, I further  assume  that lim,,0 u'(c)  = oo. (When  I 
refer to the utility derived  by agent  j from a given allocation,  I mean his ex ante utility, 
which is evaluated  before any uncertainty  has been resolved.) 
It is natural  in this environment  to use the following  definition  of first-best. 
Definition 1.1.  An allocation is first best if c + C2 =  Y, for all dates and states and 
u'(c,  )/u'(c2)  is constant over all dates and states. 
4. Several  other papers  examine  the properties  of efficient  allocations  in environments  with one-sided 
commitment--e.g.  Atkeson (1991), Marcet  and Marimon  (1992), and Phelan (1995). Marcet  and Marimon 
(1995) present  a general  procedure  to numerically  solve for efficient  allocations  in a wide range  of environments 
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It is well-known  that in any first-best  allocation,  each individual's  consumption  is a time- 
and state-invariant  function  of the aggregate  endowment.  Note that splitting  the aggregate 
endowment  in half at every date and in every state is a first-best  allocation;  also, in any 
other  first-best  allocation,  one individual  receives  less than half the aggregate  endowment 
at every  date and in every state. 
2. SUBGAME-PERFECT  ALLOCATIONS 
The two agents  interact  in the following  way. At the beginning  of period t, the realization 
of 0, becomes  known to both of them. At that point, each of the two individuals  simulta- 
neously transfers  a non-negative  amount of his current  income to the other individual 
(note that this transfer  may be zero). Thus, a period-t  history  in this dynamic  game is a 
sequence  of realizations  for 0, and non-negative  transfers  made by the agents: 
(01,  TRI,  02,  TR2,  -  ,  TRt-1,  Ot,) 
A strategy  for an agent specifies  his action after each possible history; thus, in period t, 
agent  j's strategy  is a mapping  from possible  histories  into transfer  amounts. 
A subgame-perfect  equilibrium  specifies  a strategy  for each agent such that a player's 
action (that is, choice of transfer  amounts) at a given history is optimal  given the other 
player's  strategy.  A subgame-perfect  equilibrium  allocation is the consumption  process 
(feasible  by construction)  that results  from the implementation  of these strategies. 
It is easy to characterize  the set of subgame-perfect  allocations  using the techniques 
of Abreu (1988). We first identify  the subgame-perfect  allocation that provides  the least 
utility to both of the agents. 
Lemma 2.1.  The autarkic allocation, c',  =y'  for j=  1, 2 and all t, is subgame petfect 
and provides less utility to both agents than any other subgame-perfect allocation. 
Proof.  See Appendix. 
In what follows, I will use Vaut  to denote the utility  derived  by any agent in autarky;  note 
that the symmetry  of the joint distribution  of the aggregate  endowments  guarantees  that 
Vaut  is the same for all individuals. 
Since  autarky  provides  less utility than any other  subgame-perfect  allocation,  it is the 
worst possible punishment  that can be provided  in this environment  for an agent who 
deviates  from a proposed  allocation.  This intuition  allows us to deduce  Proposition  2.1. 
Proposition 2.1.  A feasible  allocation is subgame-petfect if and only if it satisfies: 
u(cJ)+E,  ??-  u(c?+  )>u(y-)+  3 Vaut,  j=1,  2 
for  all dates and states. 
Proof.  See Appendix. 
This proposition uses the techniques  of Abreu (1988) to demonstrate  that the set of 
subgame-perfect  allocations (which I will henceforth  label F) can be fully characterized 
using  some simple  constraints.  In particular,  note that (1) and (2) imply  that r is compact 
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that the specification  of the joint distribution  of the individual  endowments,  /3 and the 
utility  function  u are such that there  exists  some non-autarkic  subgame-perfect  allocation.5 
It is well-known  that a first-best  allocation  may be subgame  perfect  if /3 is sufficiently 
large (see Kimball  (1988)). For all values of /,  though,  there  exists some first-best  alloca- 
tion that is not subgame perfect, even though both agents get more utility from the 
allocation than they do in autarky.  Indeed, if /  is small enough, then there  may not be 
any subgame-perfect  first-best  allocations.6 
3. EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS 
I define  an efficient  allocation  as follows.7 
Definition 3.1.  An allocation  (c', c2) in F is efficient if there  exists no other element 
in F that provides  both individuals  with at least as much utility and one of them with 
more. 
Define Vmax  to be the maximal  level of utility  available  to a given  agent  from an allocation 
in F, and define  the function V: [Vaut,  VmaxI+[Vaut,  Vmax] by: 
V(uo)=IMax(C,,C2)  EoZ  l0 
-I U(C2) 
s.t.  (c', c2)eF 
s.t.  Eo  Eoo  I ,B-uc)u 
The function V represents  the Pareto  frontier  in this environment.  Using arguments  analo- 
gous to those of Thomas  and Worrall  (1988), we can conclude  that V is differentiable  and 
that V satisfies  the following  functional  equation: 
(FE)  V(uo)  = Max(c,,U,)sl  s  lis[u( Ys  -  cs) + 1 V(Us)] 
s.t.  Es=, fs[u(cs)  + pus] = uo.  (P1) 
s.t.  u(cs)+Ipus?u(ys)+,BVaut,  foralls.  (P2) 
s.t.  u(Ys-cs)+flV(Us)?u(Ys-y')+flVaut,  foralls.  (P3) 
s.t.  UsE[Vaut,  Vmax]. 
This characterization  shows that we can think  about the construction  of efficient  subgame- 
perfect  allocations  using  the following  mechanical  metaphor.  A social  planner  enters  period 
t having  promised  agent 1 a certain  amount of ex ante utility, u0. Taking  this promise  as 
5. A sufficient  condition  for the existence  of a non-autarkic  subgame-perfect  allocation  is that there is 
some state s with probability  of occurrence  tr  ?05  and: 
{(I  - f)  + Pr}u'(y,)  -  P/3ru'(y.2)  < O.  (C) 
(See Kocherlakota  (1994) for a proof.) 
6. Because  any asymmetric  first-best  allocation  makes some agent strictly  worse off than the symmetric 
first-best  allocation,  there  is a subgame-perfect  first-best  allocation  if and  only  if the symmetric  first-best  allocation 
is subgame  perfect.  The symmetric  first-best  allocation  is subgame  perfect  if: 
s  7rU  =  ( Yr  /2)/(1  -  )2 u(Ys.) +  PV aut 
for all s. 
7. In this  particular  environment,  any efficient  subgame-perfect  equilibrium  is strongly  renegotiation-proof 
in the sense  of Farrell  and Maskin  (1989): see Asheim  and Strand  (1991). 600  REVIEW  OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
given in the form of (P1), the planner  seeks to maximize  the amount of ex ante utility 
agent 2 receives.  The planner  determines  how much consumption  to give to or take from 
agent 1 and how much future  utility to promise  agent 1, contingent  on each state of the 
world.  He must take into account  the sustainability  constraints  (P2)-(P3) that capture  his 
inability  to force the agents  to give up consumption  beyond  threatening  them  with future 
autarky.  The last constraint  on us requires  the choices of the social planner  to lie in the 
domain  of the value function V. 
Now, consider  an efficient  allocation  which  provides  agent 1 with utility  equal to u0. 
The maximization  problem  in (FE) makes clear that we can divide the possible  states of 
the world in period one into three  groups. 
Si: states in which constraint  (P2) binds. 
S2:  states in which constraint  (P3) binds. 
S3:  states in which neither  constraint  binds. 
(By "binds"  I mean that the multiplier  on the constraint  is positive.) It is easy to see that 
the intersection  of SI and S2 must be empty. Suppose  s lies in SI. Then, c  <y'  because 
U5  ?  Vaut.  If s lies in S2, then c5  >y'.  It follows that if s lies in SI and S2, then cs=yl  and 
Us  =  Vaut and  V(us) = Vaut.  But this means that  V(  Vaut)  = Vaut,  which is impossible as long 
as there  exists some subgame-perfect  allocation  that is non-autarkic. 
The first-order  conditions with respect  to us in the maximization  problem in (FE) 
take the following  form: 
Brs V'  (us) +4Afs  +  f  p  s  + vS FV(us )=  if Us E ( Vaut,  Vmax) 
?0  if Us =  Vaut 
_0  if Us=  Vmax  (1) 
where  A is the multiplier  on (P1), ps is the multiplier  on (P2), and vs is the multiplier  on 
(P3). We can use these first-order  conditions to describe  the evolution of ex ante utility 
over time. In particular,  the envelope  theorem  tells us that A = -  V'(uo).  Hence,  if s lies in 
SI, and u0  < Vmax,  then V'(us) < V'(uo); the strict  concavity  of V then implies  that us  > u0. 
On the other hand, if s lies in S2 and u0  > Vaut,  then V'(us) > V'(uo) and us  < u0. In words, 
this analysis tells us that it is efficient  to induce an agent with a binding sustainability 
constraint  to provide  consumption  today by promising  him more utility in the future.8  In 
contrast,  if s lies in S3, then ps and vs are both zero, and so  V'(us)  = V'(uo); in other 
words, us= u0. 
The first-order  conditions  with respect  to cs are: 
-frs  u'( Ys -cs)  + ATrs  u'(cs)  +  ps u'(cs)-Vs  u'( Ys-cs)  = 0. 
Combining  the two sets of first-order  conditions,  we obtain: 
u'( Ys-cs)/u'(cs  )=  -V'(us  )  if UsE(Vaut,  Vmax) 
>-V'(  Vmax  )  if us =  Vmax 
<-V'(  Vaut)  if  Us=  Vaut.  (2) 
This  first-order  condition  is valid  in every  date  and state.  It implies  that  given  a specification 
of Ys,  us  is a non-decreasing  function  of c5. This tells us that given a group of states with 
8. If uo  = Vaut,  and s lies in S2,  then  u  = vaut;  similarly,  if uo =  Vmax.  and s lies in SI, then  Us =Vmax. KOCHERLAKOTA  EFFICIENT RISK SHARING  601 
the same aggregate  Y, a state s lies in SI if y' is high and s lies in S2 if y2  is high: agents 
tend to face binding  sustainability  constraints  when their  income shocks are high. 
We can use these first-order  conditions to deduce the following contemporaneous 
interaction  between  agent l's consumption  and agent l's income,  conditional  on a particu- 
lar realization  of the aggregate  endowment  and on the history  of past shocks (as summar- 
ized by u0). When agent l's income is low, then agent 2's sustainability  constraint  is 
binding; as agent 2's income realization  increases,  he requires  a larger  "bribe"  in terms 
of consumption  (and future  utility) to keep him in the optimal  allocation.  When  agent l's 
income is about average,  then neither  sustainability  constraint  is binding:  in that region, 
his consumption  is flat. When agent l's income  is high, his sustainability  constraint  binds 
and his consumption  is positively correlated  with income. Thus, as long as SI or S2 is 
non-empty, there is a positive contemporaneous  correlation  between individual  income 
and individual  consumption. 
As Thomas  and Worrall  (1988) emphasize,  though, the interesting  feature  about lack 
of commitment  is that it introduces  persistence  into the efficient  allocations  even if there 
are no exogenous  dynamics.  When an agent receives  a sufficiently  high income shock so 
that his sustainability  constraint  is binding,  (1) implies  that us  rises  above u0.  This increase 
in us  will alter  the allocation  of consumption  in the following  period.  Thus, the realization 
of income in period t has an effect on consumption  in period (t + 1). Intuitively,  it is 
optimal  for any shock that cannot be smoothed  over states  because  of limited  enforcement 
to be smoothed  over time; this gives rise to persistence  in individual  consumption. 
The relationship  between  individual  consumption  and current  and lagged individual 
income gives rise to the following  proposition. 
Proposition  3.1.  In an efficient  allocation,  Cov (cl,  yV-k  I Y,-k)>  O for k>O. For k= 
0, if this conditional covariance is zero for all realizations of  Y,, then the efficient allocation 
is first best in all ensuing dates and states. 
Proof.  See Appendix. 
Hence, in any efficient  allocation, the correlation  between individual  consumption  and 
current and lagged individual  income, conditional on aggregate  consumption,  is non- 
negative. The next section investigates  under what conditions, efficiency  in the face of 
limited  enforcement  implies  that this conditional  correlation  is positive,  as is found in the 
data. 
4. THE LONG-RUN BEHAVIOUR OF EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS 
In this section, I examine  the long-run  dynamics  of efficient  allocations.  I will focus on 
the  long-run  behaviour  of  the  ex  ante  utility  received  by  agent  1,  u, 
E, ES_0  Psu(c,s+  I  ), although  the results  are easily generalized  to consumption  itself. 
4A.  When Subgame-Perfect First-Best Allocations Exist 
Suppose  the symmetric  first-best  allocation  is subgame  perfect.  Define  UFB  to be the lowest 
level of ex ante utility associated  with a subgame-perfect  first-best  allocation,  and uFB  to 
be the highest  level  of ex ante  utility  associated  with a subgame-perfect  first-best  allocation. 602  REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 
Similarly,  define  the stochastic  process  cFB  to be individual  l's allocation  in the first-best 
allocation  that  provides  him  ex ante  utility  UFB,  and  define  CFB to be individual  l's consump- 
tion stream  in the first-best  allocation  that provides  him ex ante utility  UFB.  Note that the 
definition  of UFB guarantees  that if agent  j is promised  more than  UFB in any given state, 
then his sustainability  constraint  does not bind in that state. 
Suppose  uo  lies in the set I= [UFB,  UFB].  Then there  exists a subgame-perfect  first-best 
allocation  which  provides  this ex ante  utility  to agent 1; this allocation  is therefore  efficient. 
In these kinds of allocations,  u, is constant over all dates and states at its initial level u0. 
It is more interesting  to think about the dynamic  path of u, in efficient  allocations  in 
which u0 does not lie in L Suppose for example  u0>  uFB.  Agent l's utility can only rise 
above u0  in period 1 if his sustainability  constraint  binds; but, because  uo>  UFB,  agent I's 
constraint  can never  bind if he is promised  more than u0. It follows that if u0  > UFB,  agent 
l's sustainability  constraint  never  binds, and with probability  one, ul <u0o. 
We also know that if uo>  UFB, agent 2's sustainability  constraint  binds with positive 
probability  in period I; otherwise,  neither  agent's sustainability  constraint  is binding  in 
any state, and uo  would be associated  with a subgame-perfect  first-best  allocation.  So, if 
uo  >  UFB, agent 1's  utility  declines  with  positive  probability.  Can  agent 1's  utility  ever  decline 
below uFB? The answer  is no. Agent 2's utility can only rise above his initial level V(uo) 
in any state  if his sustainability  constraint  is binding  in that state;  but his constraint  cannot 
bind in any state in which he is promised  more than UFB  (and agent 1 is promised  less 
than  UFB). 
Thus, if u0  > uFB,  there  is some state in period 1 such that agent 2's utility  is no more 
than  UFB,  and agent l's utility is strictly  less than uo. Reasoning  by induction,  this means 
that in any efficient  allocation  such that uo  >  UFB,  u, either  equals u,  or falls below u, 
Eventually,  u, converges  to UFB. 
This logic generates  the following  proposition. 
Proposition 4.1.  Suppose that somefirst-best allocation is subgame  perfect. If uo  > UFB, 
then with  probability one, u, converges monotonically to UFB.  If uO  <  UFB,  then with  probability 
one, u, converges monotonically to UFB. 
Proof.  See Appendix. 
The above result can be extended  to consumption:  in an efficient  allocation, along 
almost every sample path,  Ic,  -  cFB(  Y)I  converges to 0 (where cFB(Y,)  is the amount of 
consumption  that the least equal subgame-perfect  first-best  allocation  delivers  to agent 1 
when  the  aggregate  endowment  equals Y,). In this  sense,  if a first-best  allocation  is subgame 
perfect,  then any efficient  allocation  of consumption  converges  with probability  one to a 
first-best  allocation.  Thus, if people are sufficiently  patient that some first-best  allocation 
is subgame  perfect,  then  absence  of commitment  cannot  justify  the observed  lack of divers- 
ification  in individual  consumption  as being efficient. 
4B.  When  No First-Best Allocations Are Subgame Peifect 
Suppose  that the contemporaneous  covariance  between  individual  income  and individual 
consumption,  conditional  on aggregate  consumption,  is zero in an efficient  allocation.  The 
second  part of Proposition  3.1 then implies  that the ensuing  allocation  of resources  in all 
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conditional  covariance  is positive  in any efficient  allocation.  In this subsection,  I strengthen 
this result  considerably,  and show that in the long run,  not just the sign but the magnitude 
of this correlation  is the same in all efficient  allocations.  From an empirical  point of view, 
this is a crucial result: it means that the quantitative  implications  of efficiency  can be 
compared  to the data without  having  to know (the generally  unobservable)  initial  division 
of surplus  between  the agents. 
To obtain this limiting  result,  it is helpful  to first  note from  the form  of the functional 
equation  (FE) that in an efficient  allocation,  u, must  follow a Markov  process  with realiza- 
tions in the compact set [ Vaut,  Vmax].  In particular,  given an efficient  allocation: 
Pr (u,,I=  ulu,,  u, 1, . . . , uo) = Pr (u,?I=  ulu,). 
The easily verified  continuity  and monotonicity  of the policy functions  us are enough to 
insure  that this Markov  process  is monotone and satisfies  the Feller  property  (see Stokey 
and Lucas with Prescott (SLP) (1989)); this tells us that for any initial u0, the utility 
Markov  process  converges  weakly to some stationary  distribution.  However,  we have to 
guarantee  that utility in different  efficient  allocations (that is, different  initial conditions 
for u0) do not converge to different  limiting distributions.  The following proposition 
delivers  this guarantee  by demonstrating  that the utility Markov  process  satisfies  a crucial 
mixing  condition. 
Proposition 4.2.  Suppose there is no subgame-perfectfirst-best allocation. Then, as t 
goes to infinity, Pr (u, Iuo) converges weakly to the same non-degenerate  limiting distribution 
for  all uo  in [ Vaut,  Vmax]. 
Proof.  See Appendix. 
It is immediate  from Proposition  4.2 that the limiting  joint distribution  of the agents' 
consumptions  exists and is the same in all efficient  allocations. 
5.  THE  EFFECT  OF  HISTORY  IN  EFFICIENT  ALLOCATIONS 
Wang (1994) looks at the properties  of the efficient  allocations  of risk in an environment 
in which two agents  cannot observe  the realizations  of each other's  endowments  but can 
fully commit to future  transfer  arrangements.  He finds that in the long run, the uncondi- 
tional probability  distribution  of consumption  converges  to a limit that is independent  of 
the initial division of surplus  between  the two agents.  (Wang's  results  in this regard  differ 
from much of the rest of the private information  literature  (e.g. Atkeson and Lucas 
(1992)), because, as I do in this paper, he requires  individual  consumption  sets to be 
bounded from above and below.) He proves that in efficient  allocations,  individual  con- 
sumption  is positively  correlated  with individual  income,  conditional  on the realization  of 
aggregate  income,  and that individual  consumption  is potentially  related  to lagged  realiza- 
tions of both individuals'  incomes. 
Thus, the implications  of efficiency  in symmetric-information/no-commitment  worlds 
(with no subgame-perfect  first-best  allocation)  are qualitatively  similar  to the implications 
of efficiency  in asymmetric-information/full-commitment  environments.  Given this simi- 
larity, it is natural  to ask how to determine  which of the two models is more empirically 
relevant.  As it turns  out, the way history  matters  in efficient  allocations  in the two environ- 
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To see this, note that the functional  equation  (FE) implies  that in an efficient  alloca- 
tion in a symmetric-information/no-commitment  world, the past is fully summarized  by 
the current  position of the economy  on the Pareto  frontier  (u,). If agent I's ex ante utility 
were  observable,  then this implication  would be testable,  but in general,  there  is little data 
available  on individual  ex ante  utilities.  However,  we have seen  in (2) that efficiency  implies 
that: 
u'(c, )/u (c, ) =-V'(u,)  if U, E  (  Vaut, Vmax) 
where cJ  is agent j's  consumption in period t. This means that there is a one-to-one 
relationship  between  the ratio u'(c2  )/u'(cl ) and the position  of the economy  on the Pareto 
frontier.  Hence, in a symmetric-information/no-commitment  world, the marginal  utility 
ratio u'(c 2)/U'(C  )  is a sufficient  statistic  for the evolution  of efficient  allocations. 
The logic of the result  extends  easily  to N-person  symmetric-information/no-commit- 
ment environments.  Define y, to be an (N-  1)-dimensional  vector where  the nth compo- 
nent yn is equal to the ratio u'(c  N)/U'(Cn);  define V(ul,  .,  UN-  I)  to be the maximal  level 
of utility  that agent  N can get from  a subgame-perfect  allocation,  given  that agent  n, n  < N, 
gets utility level un  . Then, the first-order  conditions  of an analogue  to (FE) imply that if 
the utility vector (un  N  -)  I is in the interior  of the domain9  of the value function V, then 
the gradient  of  V equals -y,.  Because V is strictly concave, knowing the gradient is 
equivalent  to knowing  the position on the Pareto  frontier;  as in the two-agent  case, y, is 
a sufficient  statistic  for the evolution of the system  over time.'0 
This implication of  efficiency  in symmetric-information/no-commitment  environ- 
ments can be evaluated  using a panel of T observations  over time on the consumptions 
of N people in a risk-sharing  pool." The sufficiency  of y, as a summary  statistic  for the 
past can be written  formally  as: 
Pr ((,  n=I  ttY  ((Cn_s  )n  =1)s=  I ) = Pr ((c,n+ X n 
=I|W 
Thus,  the sufficiency  of y, means  that current  and lagged  consumption  have no additional 
explanatory  power  beyond y, in forming  forecasts  of future  consumption.  One way to test 
this restriction  is to run a time-series  regression  of c,+1 (keeping  n fixed) on the lagged 
vector y, and on other  lagged  information;  in this regression,  the other  lagged  information 
should be insignificant. 
It is also true that the current  position of the economy on the Pareto frontier  is a 
sufficient  statistic  for the future  evolution  of efficient  allocations  in economies  with private 
information  and full commitment.  However,  in a private  information  world,  consumption 
in any given state enters into the incentive compatibility  constraints  for other states; 
consequently,  there  is no direct  linkage  between  the current  realization  of the vector y, of 
marginal  utility ratios and the current  realization  of the slope of the Pareto frontier.  It 
follows that the vector of marginal  utility ratios will typically  not be a sufficient  statistic 
for the past in efficient  allocations  if information  is private. 
9.  In a two-person allocation problem, the domain of the value function is simply the interval [ Vau,t,  Vrnax  ] 
In an N-person allocation  problem, the (N-  1)-dimensional domain  of  the value function is still convex,  but 
the set is not a cross-product of intervals. 
10. As stated, this result relies on the i.i.d. structure of individual incomes. More generally, if the state 0, 
is first-order Markov, then efficiency implies that the vector (y,,  0,)  is a sufficient statistic for the evolution  of 
the system. 
11. Throughout the above discussion, I assume that the econometrician knows a priori  the cardinal utility 
function u. This assumption is certainly not true in all settings. However, if u is known at least up to a finite- 
dimensional parameter, the restrictions implied by efficiency should serve to identify the unknown parameters 
(much as the restrictions implied by individual optimality do so in tests of asset-pricing models). Also, if u(c)= 
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Thus, we can use consumption  data to discriminate  between  two competing  hypoth- 
eses about the sources of imperfect  consumption  diversification.  However,  it is still true 
that the role of y, as a summary  statistic  for the past is only a weak necessary  condition 
of efficiency  in symmetric-information/full-commitment  environments;  many inefficient 
allocations  also satisfy  this property.  For example,  if (c', c2) is the equilibrium  allocation 
that  emerges  from  two individuals  trading  a single  risk-free  security  over  time,  the marginal 
utility ratio is a sufficient  statistic  to describe  the evolution  of the allocation.  Nonetheless, 
the allocation  is typically  inefficient.'2 
Fortunately,  the econometrician  can test stronger  implications  of efficiency  if he has 
data on individual  income as well as individual  consumption.  To obtain these stronger 
implications  of efficiency,  it is first  necessary  to sort the N people in any given  period  into 
those  who are  constrained  by their  sustainability  constraint  and those  who are  not. Suppose 
first  that agent  N is unconstrained  in period  t and agent  n is constrained.  Just  as in the two- 
person  case, agent  n's binding  sustainability  constraint  implies  that the partial  derivative  of 
the value function V with respect  to un must be lower in period t than it was last period; 
hence, y,>  y,  . (Recall that the negative  of the gradient  of V equals the vector y, with 
nth component  yn =  u'(cYN)/u'(cn)  if the vector  of reservation  utilities  lies in the interior  of 
the domain of V.) 
Reasoning  in a similar  way, we see that if agent N is unconstrained  and agent n is 
unconstrained,  then yn =  n,_.  On the other hand, if agent N is constrained,  and agent n 
is unconstrained,  then yn < yn,_;  if agent N is constrained,  and both agents  n and m are 
unconstrained,  then  nl/y,n=  y,_  /y',.  We can combine all of this analysis  to find the 
set C, of constrained  agents and the set U, of unconstrained  agents  in any date and state 
using data on their  consumptions.  Define: 
RI,=_minn  y, /Y,-  X 
Then: 
R,>IC,={1,2,..  . ,N-I}  and  U,={N}. 
R,  = I  =C, = {n In >  n,_  }  and  U,={n  y  =  y,_X} 
R,< I  =C,=  {nI  yI/yl,  >R,}u{N}  and  U,={nl y/yn  ,  }_  Rt 
Our earlier  analysis  about how history  matters  in an efficient  allocation  showed  that 
the current  realization  of y, is determined  wholly by the lagged realization  y,_,  and the 
current  realization  of individual  incomes.  Put another  way, there  is a function  g such that: 
(Cn)n  =  =  g(  yt_  I(  yn  N  ) 
But, as it turns out, efficiency  restricts  the form of this function. Suppose an agent is 
promised  ex ante utility  un,_ before  the resolution  of uncertainty  in period  t. He then gets 
a sufficiently  high income realization  that he hits his sustainability  constraint  in period t. 
Given that this occurs, when the planner  chooses a new level of ex ante utility for agent 
n, the choice ignores  the past promise  un,_; all that matters  is that the agent is currently 
bound by a sustainability  constraint-the level of which is determined  wholly by y  . 
12. The work of Beaudry  and DiNardo (1995) is susceptible  to this criticism:  they test implications  of 
optimal labour  contracting  in the absence  of commitment  that are also characteristic  of a wide class of sub- 
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This kind of reasoning  tells us that in an efficient  allocation, there is a function h 
such that: 
cn =h(yn,  d,,  (y  ,n-  t),n.  U,  (4) 
for any n in the set of constrained  agents C,. (Recall that U, is the set of unconstrained 
agents.) Note that h is symmetric  in (y-%  ),nEu,  and symmetric  in (y  u,  The key 
difference  between  (3) and (4) is that (4) requires  c, not to depend  on the value of y_I, 
once it is known that agent  n is constrained.  The evolution  of efficient  allocations  displays 
"amnesia"  in the sense that the planner  essentially  "forgets"  the past income  realizations, 
as summarized  through  yn_,  of any agents who are constrained  in period t. 
Empirically,  this implication  can be tested by regressing  all c, for which n lies in C, 
on  the  corresponding  variables  (ytL  t  -(  Y7t'  ),n  e  U).  (Note  that  this  regression 
implicitly  exploits  the stability  of h both over time and across  all constrained  individuals.) 
Amnesia  implies  that in this regression,  the variable  n_7,  should be insignificant. 
All of the above analysis  assumes  that the econometrician  has access  to well-measured 
consumption  and income  data. In many situations,  this assumption  is troubling.  Figuring 
out how to evaluate  these  types of empirical  implications  in the face of measurement  error 
is an interesting  problem,  but one that is beyond the scope of this paper. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The main message of this paper is that at least in a qualitative  sense, a model with 
two-sided  lack of commitment,  symmetric  information  and no subgame-perfect  first-best 
allocations  is capable  of generating  implications  that are  consistent  with  casual  characteriz- 
ations of individual  and cross-country  data on consumption  and income. For example,  in 
stochastic  steady state, there is idiosyncratic  risk remaining  in individual  consumption, 
and individual  consumption  is (potentially) conditionally  correlated  with many lags of 
income. 
To contrast  the "efficiency  without  commitment"  explanation  from other  rationaliza- 
tions of these stylized facts about consumption, the paper shows that history matters 
in a distinctive  manner  in efficient  allocations  in symmetric-information/no-commitment 
environments.  In particular,  in the evolution  of efficient  allocations  over time,  the (normal- 
ized) vector of marginal  utilities  is a sufficient  statistic  for all past information,  and that 
the economy "forgets" the past realizations  of  income for agents who are currently 
constrained. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 2.1.  It is clear  that autarky  is subgame  perfect.  Now consider  the set of possible  period- 
zero  utility  levels  that agent I derives  from  subgame-perfect  allocations.  This set is bounded  from  below (by 0). 
Hence,  it has an infimum;  call this value M. 
Consider  an arbitrary  subgame-perfect  allocation  (c,), and let Vo  denote the utility derived  by agent I 
from  this allocation.  From the point of view of period  zero, there  are S possible  outcomes  associated  with the 
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Agent I must be better  off choosing  c than opting  not to make  any transfers;  hence: 
Vo  > E, lr (u(cv  ) +i  Vs  ) 
where c' and V' are his state s consumption  and continuation  utilities respectively  if he fails to make any 
transfers.  But c'  y,  and VI> M; this implies  that: 
Vo?ZS  Esr(U(ys)+  fPM). 
Since VO  is any subgame-perfect  utility  level, it follows  that: 
M > (L  lr,(U(ys))/(l- 
Since  autarky  is subgame  perfect,  the weak inequality  is actually  an equality.  11 
Proof  of Proposition  2.1.  Suppose  an allocation  satisfies  this  condition.  Write  down  a non-negative  transfer 
scheme  that generates  the allocation  (this is possible  because  it is feasible).  Then specify  the following  strategy 
for each individual.  If in the past, all individuals  have acted so as to follow the transfer  scheme,  then follow it 
yourself  today.  If they have  not, then  make  no transfers.  This  collection  of strategies  is clearly  a subgame-perfect 
equilibrium. 
Now suppose  that the allocation  (cl , c2) is subgame  perfect.  Consider  agent I at a particular  date and 
state. We know that it must be at least as good for him to consume  c, as to make  no transfers;  hence: 
u(c,)+E,  E  ZIu(c,+,)>u(c)+IPV' 
where c, is his current  consumption  and V' is his expected  utility from future  consumption  if he makes no 
transfers  today. Since  c,>y,,  and V'> Vaut,  (1) follows.  11 
Proof of Proposition  3.1.  I will prove the proposition  for k=  I; the other values of k can be handled 
similarly.  Note that the first-order  conditions  (1-2) imply  that: 
c=f(y,  Y,,u,_) 
=f(y',  Y,, g(Y,- I, Y,- I, U,-2)) 
wheref and g are both non-decreasing  in all arguments.  Hence: 
COV(C,y',  1,Y, Y,, Y,-1,U,_2)>0. 
Recall  from basic probability  that if F is a finer  sigma  algebra  than G, then: 
E{Cov (X, YI  F)lG} =Cov (X, YI  G)-Cov  {E(XI F), E(YI  F)IG}. 
In this case, think about F as the sigma  algebra  generated  by (y, Y,, Y,  u,  U,-2),  and G as the sigma  algebra 
generated  by Y, ,.  Because  y -  is independent  of ( Y,, y, u,  -2),  we can conclude  that: 
OE{Cov(c,y,_jjy,  Y,,  Y-,  ,u,_2)lyY,  }=Cov(c,y,l-jY,-1) 
which  concludes  the proof of the inequality  for k = 1. 
Finally,  note that Cov (c, y I  Y,, u, -  ) = 0 for all values  of Y, if and only if all s lie in S3  when uo=  u, - I  . 
But this means  that us  = u,_- for all s, and so neither  agent's  sustainability  constraint  will ever  bind again.  11 
Proof of Proposition  4.1.  Consider  the set of sample  paths along which every state s occurs infinitely 
often; this set of paths has measure  one. Pick an arbitrary  sample  path in this set. We know that along this 
path, u, is a non-increasing  sequence  that is bounded  from below by uFB;  it must converge  to some uO.  Define 
v(u)  = Mins  uj(u); v is continuous.  Because  every  state occurs  infinitely  often along this path, for any T, there 
exists t>  T such that U,  <  V(UT).  Allowing T to go to infinity,  we see that u* < v(u*).  But u* > v(u*)  for all 
u>  u  F;  hence,  u  = uF  . Thus, u, converges  to uFB with probability  one.  | 
Proof of Proposition 4.2.  V is continuous  and maps [Vau,, Vmax] into itself; hence,  V has a fixed point 
u* such that V(u*)  = u.  Thus, there is an efficient  subgame-perfect  allocation  that provides  both agents  with 
the same level of utility. Suppose  SI is empty when uo  = U*. The symmetry  of the problem  then says that S2 
should be empty also. But this is impossible  because  there  is no subgame-perfect  first-best  allocation.  Thus, in 
the efficient  allocation  in which  both agents  receive  utility  u*, SI and S2 are both non-empty  in period  one. 
I want  to prove that starting from uo  = Vau,,  there is some  t such that u,> u* with positive  probability. 
Define the function  v(u)  -Max,  uR(u).  Start  with an arbitrary  uo  < u.  We know that if SI is non-empty  when 
uo= u*, Si is non-empty  for any uoe( V,,,, u*); because  there  is a non-autarkic  subgame-perfect  allocation,  if 
uo  = Vaut,  there exists  some  s  such that  us> Va,,.  Hence,  v(uo) > uo for all uoeL  [ Vaut,  u*).  Define the sequence 
{Wv }x=  I recursively by the formula Wvn  =  v(W  I,)  and w0  = uo. The set SI must be non-empty for any initial level 
of utility less than u* so Wn,  > w,,  -  1  for any tv,,  -?  uO. 608  REVIEW  OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
Suppose  there  does not exist any n such that iv,,>  u*. Then, {wv,,  })'=I is a strictly  increasing  sequence  that 
is bounded  from  above  by u*; w,,  converges  to some  limit  w4*  that  is less  than  or equal  to uO.  Since  v is continuous 
(from  the Theorem  of the Maximum),  this limit  must  satisfy  v(w*) = w*. But this is impossible  because  v(u)  > u 
for any u  <  u. 
Thus,  it is possible  to start  at uo= Vau,  and to find  t such  that the probability  that u, exceeds  u*  is a positive 
value e. Similarly, we can find r such that if uo  = Vmax, Pr (u, < u* I  uo  =  Vmax  ) >  E. The utility Markov process 
satisfies  Assumption  12.1 of SLP and therefore  Theorem  12.12  of SLP applies  to it. 
Note that the limiting  distribution  of utility must be symmetric.  Hence, it can only be degenerate  if it 
places  all mass on u* such that V(u*)  =u*; however,  both agents'  sustainability  constraints  bind with positive 
probability  when uo  = u* (or it would be first best), and so a distribution  with all mass on u* cannot be a 
stochastic  steady-state.  Hence, the steady-state  cross-sectional  distribution  of utility is not degenerate  in an 
efficient  allocation.  11 
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